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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS

THE EXPULSION OF ALIENS AND OTHER TOPICS: THE S IXTY -FOURTH SESSION OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LAW C OMMISSION

[forthcoming in 107 AMERICAN J OURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013)]

By Sean D. Murphy

The International Law Commission held its sixty-fourth session in Geneva from
May 7 to June 1, and from July 2 to August 3, 2012, under the chairmanship of Lucius
Caflisch.1 The session marked the first year of a new quinquennium (2012-2016), with
the Commission having completed its work during the prior quinquennium on four
major topics: transboundary aquifers; reservations to treaties; responsibility of
international organizations; and effects of armed conflict on treaties. 2

The central topic under discussion during the sixty-fourth session concerned the
expulsion of aliens, which led to the adoption on first reading of thirty-two articles,

1

See Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Sixty-Fourth

Session, UN GAOR, 64th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 1-2, UN Doc. A/67/10 (2006)
[hereinafter 2012 Report].
2

See Donald McRae, The Work of the International Law Commission, 2007-2011, 106

AM. J. INT’ L L. 322, 325-31 (2012).

2
together   with   commentaries,   regarding   a   State’s   power   to   remove   non -nationals
coercively   from   its   territory.   Work   proceeded  on  the   other  topics   already   on   the   ILC’s  
agenda and two new topics were added to that agenda: the provisional application of
treaties and customary international law.

I. EXPULSION OF ALIENS

The issue of expulsion of aliens is an important and controversial issue in the
national politics of many nations. In 2004, the ILC included this topic on its agenda and
appointed Maurice Kamto (Cameroon) as ILC special rapporteur. Kamto has submitted
eight reports analyzing the law in this area and proposing a series of draft articles that
partly codify and partly progressively develop the law. After several years of
development  of   those  articles   through  discussions  in   the   ILC’s  plenary   sessions   and  in  
its drafting committee, thirty-two articles were adopted on “first reading” during the
sixty-fourth session, together with commentaries. 3 The draft articles recognize a general
right   of   states   to   expel   aliens   from   their   territory,   but   only   “in   accordance   with   the  
present draft articles and other applicable rules of international law, in particular those
relating  to  human  rights.” 4

3

Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, in 2012 Report, supra note 1, at 18, para. 46

[hereinafter Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens].
4

Id., Art. 3.

3
The  draft  articles  define  “alien”  as  a  person  who  does  not  have  the  nationality  of  
the state engaging in the expulsion,5 thus covering both persons with a foreign
nationality   and   stateless   persons.   The   alien   must   be   “present   in   the   territory”   of   the  
state,”6 which excludes aliens who enter an embassy, consulate, military base, or other
facility of the state located abroad, as well as aliens stopped on vess els located outside
territorial waters. Such aliens include persons who are displaced across a border, 7
perhaps due to a famine or an internal armed conflict. By way of example, the some
200,000 persons who have fled from Syria into Jordan over the past tw o years 8 would
be covered by these articles, whether or not they are classified as refugees or they
entered Jordan legally.

“Expulsion”   is   defined   as   “a   formal   act,   or   conduct   consisting   of   an   action   or  
omission, attributable to a State by which an alien is compelled to leave the territory of
that  State....”9 At  the  same  time,  “expulsion”  does  not  include  extradition  of  a  person  to  
another state, does not include surrender of a person to an international tribunal, and
does   not   include   the   “non-admission”   of a person to a state, unless that person is a

5

6

Id., Art. 2(b).
Id., Art. 1(1).

7

2012 Report, supra note 1, at 20.

8

See Aida Alami, Syrians Join Relief Efforts for Countrymen in Jordan, N.Y. TIMES ,

Sept. 13, 2012, at A1.
9

Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 3, Art. 2(a).
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“refugee.”10 This last carve-out means that a person who is stopped at the border of a
state or at a port of entry (such as an airport) and who is identified as not able to enter
the country lawfully, may be sent back by immigration authorities to the place from
whence   they   came   without   being   regarded   as   “expelled,”   even   though   the   person   was  
physically   present   (temporarily)   in   the   state,   unless   they   are   a   “refugee”   within   the  
meaning of relevant international treaties.11 The draft articles also do not apply to
persons who enjoy privileges and immunities under international law, such as diplomats
or military personnel covered by a status of forces agreement. 12 Such persons may be
expelled by the state in accordance with whatever rules apply for the regime through
which they receive their privileges and immunities.

Though the draft articles do not cover situations of non-admission, they do cover
aliens who are unlawfully present in the state, 13 whether by entering the state legally but
then becoming illegal (perhaps by overstaying the term of a visa), or by entering the
state illegally and undetected. 14 The protections accorded to illegal aliens are almost
identical to those accorded to legal aliens, such as those who have been resident in the
10

Id. Such exclusions are also likely intended to cover transfers of prisoners due to law

enforcement agreements, for purposes of testifying or serving a sentence in another
country.
11

2012 Report, supra note 1, at 21.

12

Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 3, Art. 1(2).

13

Id., Art. 1(1).

14

2012 Report, supra note 1, at 19 & 21.
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state for many years. By granting to illegal aliens largely the same protections as are
accorded to legal aliens, the draft articles move beyond the national laws of many states
and the European Union, 15 and beyond provisions on expulsion contained in widelyadhered-to human rights instruments, 16 which differentiate between the two groups.

As   noted   above,   a   state   may   expel   the   alien,   but   only   “in   accordance   with   the  
present draft articles and other applicable rules of international law, in particular those
relating  to  human  rights.” 17 That language suggests that a state must comply with both
obligations   identified   in   the   draft   articles   and   in   “other   applicable   rules,”   such   as  
multilateral treaties to which it is a party. Left unsaid in the draft articles is what should

15

Expulsion of Aliens: Memorandum by the Secretariat of the International Law

Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/565, at 98-101 (2006) [hereinfter Secretariat 2006
Memorandum].
16

For examples of treaties that accord protections only to aliens lawfully present in the

state, see U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art 32, 19
U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150; International Covenant on Civil and Political R ights,
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 13, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (ICCPR); 1955 European Convention on
Establishment, art. 3; American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art.
22(6),1144 U.N.T.S. 123, 9 I.L.M. 673, as amended by protocols of Nov. 14, 1988, 28
I.L.M. 156,  and  June  8,  1990,  29  I.L.M.  1447;;  African  Charter  on  Human  and  People’s  
Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 12(4), 21 I.L.M. 58; League of Arab States Charter on
Human Rights, May 22, 2004, art. 26, reprinted in 12 INT'L HUM . R TS . R EP. 893 (2005).
17

Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 3, Art. 3.

6
happen  if  the  draft  articles  conflict  with  “other  applicable  rules.”  For  example,  several  
major human rights instruments set forth obligations relating to expulsion, 18 but also
allow for derogation from those obligations in a time of emergency. 19 The draft articles,
by contrast, contain no provision allowing for derogation in time of emergency, so it
appears possible that, in certain situations, the draft articles might require the state to
respect rights relating   to   expulsion,   while   the   “other   applicable   rules”   would   not.   One  
technique for sorting out such conflicts might be to choose the norm -set most favorable
to the alien, although this would mean setting aside some very fundamental rules in
widely-adhered-to treaties. Yet the current ILC commentary to this article seems to
indicate  otherwise,  by  stating  that  “other  applicable  rules”  includes  rules  on  derogation  
in times of emergency, implying that, in the event of a conflict, even other norms less
protective of the alien should apply. Greater clarity may be necessary on this point; as
noted above, several international treaties that address expulsion accord protections
only  to  persons  “legally  present”  in  a  state’s  territory,  while  denying  such  protection s to
persons   not   legally   present.   If   those   “other   applicable   rules”   govern   in   the   event   of  
conflict, then coverage by these draft articles of illegal aliens may be largely illusory.

A state wishing to expel an alien who falls within the scope of the draf t articles
must  do  so  “only  in  pursuance  of  a  decision  reached  in  accordance  with  law, ”20 and that
decision must be based upon a ground for expulsion that is provided for in the national

18

See, e.g., ICCPR, Art. 13.

19

See, e.g., id., Art. 4.

20

Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 3, Art. 4.
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law,  which  “shall  be  assessed  in  good  faith  and  reasonably.” 21 Thus, if the national law
allows for expulsion of an alien because he procured his admission improperly, such as
by marriage fraud, or because he has committed a serious crime, then the alien may be
expelled.

Once an alien is identified as subject to expulsion, the state must accord to him
or her a range of procedural protections, including the right to receive notice of the
decision to expel, to challenge the decision before a competent authority, and to be
represented before that authority, including with the assistance of an interpreter if
necessary. 22 These procedural protections, however, can be deviated from if the alien
has been unlawfully present in the territory for less than six months, 23 a somewhat
arbitrary deadline selected out of a recognition that many states do not accord such
procedural rights when expelling illegal aliens. Moreover, only appeals lodged by aliens
lawfully  present  in  the  state  have  a  “suspensive  effect”  on  the  expulsion until the appeal
is resolved. 24 All aliens, however, if detained must be kept separate from the normal
prison population, the detention cannot be punitive or for an unrestricted duration, the
detention must be reviewed at regular intervals, and it must normally end if the
expulsion cannot be carried out. 25
21

Id., Art. 5.

22

Id., Art. 26(1).

23

Id., Art. 26(4).

24

Id., Art. 27.

25

Id., Art. 19.
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Various types of expulsions are flatly prohibited. The state cannot expel a
refugee (or a person who has applied for refugee status) or a stateless person except on
grounds of national security or public order. 26 The   state   cannot   “make   its   national   an  
alien,  by  deprivation  of  nationality,  for  the  sole  purpose  of  expelling  him  or  her.” 27 The
state cannot collectively expel aliens as a group, though it may expel all enemy aliens in
time of armed conflict, when permitted under the jus in bello.28 The state cannot engage
in   “disguised   expulsion,”   by   which   is   meant   committing   acts   or   omissions   with   the  
intent of indirectly forcing the alien to depart. 29 (This form of expulsion is often

26

Id., Arts. 6 & 7.

27

Id.,  Art.  9.    This  is  the  one  draft  article  that  regulates  a  state’s  treatment  of  its  own  

nationals and, indeed, is a rule about nationality law, not about expulsion as such. A
reformulation more oriented toward expulsion might prohibit a state from expelling an
alien whose nationality it has withdrawn solely for the purpose of expulsion.
28

Id., Art. 10; see Secretariat 2006 Memorandum, supra note  15  at  546,  para.  951  (“A  

State may be entitled to expel all enemy aliens in the context of an armed conflict under
international law, even though this may result in the expulsion of a large number of
individuals.”).  On  mass  expulsions  generally,  see  J EAN -M ARIE HENCKAERTS , M ASS
EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1995).
29

Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note  3,  Art.  11.  The  “intent”  element  

of this definition is important. If a state fires an alien from a government position, and
due to the loss of that job the alien has no economic choice but to return to his own

9
referred to in English  as  “constructive  expulsion,”  but  that  term  does  not  translate  well  
into other languages.) The state cannot expel an alien for the purpose of confiscating his
or her assets 30 or to circumvent an ongoing extradition procedure. 31

Even if expulsion is permissible, it must be undertaken with humanity, with
respect   for   the   alien’s   dignity, 32 without discrimination based on various categories
(such as race and sex), 33 and   with   regard   for   “vulnerable   persons”   (such   as   pregnant  
women).34 Various human rights are asserted as applying to aliens who are subject to
expulsion, including the right to life, the right not to be tortured, and the right to family
life.35 The   state   must   first   pursue   a   “voluntary   departure”   of   the   alien   but,   if   forced  
expulsion is necessary,   the   state   must   give   the   alien   “a   reasonable   period   of   time   to  
prepare  for  his  or  her  departure,  having  regard  to  all  the  circumstances.” 36

state,  the  alien  has  not  been  “expelled”  unless  it  can  be  shown  that  the  firing  was  
undertaken with the intention of provoking the departure.
30

Id., Art. 12.

31

Id., Art. 13.

32

Id., Art. 14.

33

Id., Art. 15.

34

Id., Art. 16.

35

Id., Arts. 17, 18, & 20.

36

Id., Art. 21.
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As for the destination of the expellee, the draft articles provide that the alien
“shall   be   expelled   to   his   or   her State of nationality or any other State that has the
obligation to receive the alien under international law, or to any State willing to accept
him or her at the request of the expelling State or, where appropriate, of the alien in
question.”37 If no such   state   can   be   identified,   then   the   alien   can   be   expelled   “to   any  
State where he or she has a right of entry or stay or, where applicable, to the State from
where  he  or  she  has  entered  the  expelling  State.” 38 An alien cannot be expelled to a state
where his or her life or freedom would be threatened on grounds such as race or sex, 39
or where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be subject to
torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 40 A state that does not
apply   the   death   penalty   may   not   expel   an   alien   to   another   state   “where   the   life   of   the  

37

Id., Art. 22(1).

38

Id., Art. 22(2).

39

40

Id., Art. 23.
Id., Art. 24. The non-refoulement provision of the Convention Against Torture and

Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 1 0, 1984, art. 3(1),
S. TREATY DOC. N O. 100-20 (1988), 1465 U.N.T.S. 85, is limited to the sending of a
person to another State where he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, so
the  draft  articles  go  further  in  adding  “or  to  cruel,  inhuman  or  degrading treatment or
punishment.”
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alien   would   be   threatened   with   the   death   penalty,”   unless   it   obtains   assurance   that   the  
death penalty will not be imposed or carried out. 41

If an alien is unlawfully expelled, he or she has the right to be readmitted to the
state  “if  it  is  established  by  a  competent  authority  that  the  expulsion  was  unlawful,  save  
where his or her return constitutes a threat to national security or public order, or where
the alien otherwise no longer fulfils the conditions for admission under the law of the
expelling  State.” 42

The thirty-two articles, together with commentaries, are not yet final. Having
undergone  a  “first  reading,”  they  are  now  being   sent to governments for comments and
observations by no later than January 1, 2014. After that, the Commission will proceed
to revise and improve the articles and commentary during the “second reading,” with
the intention of their completion and adoption in 2015.

II. OTHER TOPICS

Obligation to extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare)

In 2005, the Commission decided to include this topic in its program of work and
to appoint Zdzislaw Galicki (Poland) as Special Rapporteur. Ultimately, a working
group was also formed to assist the Special Rapporteur, who produced four reports (in
41

Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, supra note 3, Art. 23(2).

42

Id., Art. 29.
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2006, 2007, 2008, and 2011). With the start of the new quinquennium in 2012, the
Commission decided not to appoint a new special rapporteur to replace Galicki, who
was no longer a member of the Commission. Instead, the Commission established a
working group chaired by Kriangsak Kittichaisaree (Thailand), for the purpose of
considering the best way forward. After several meetings, the group asked the chair to
prepare a working paper for the sixty-fifth session “reviewing the various perspectives in
relation to the topic  in  light  of  the  judgment”  of  the International Court on July 20, 2012 in
Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite.43

While the general subject of of aut dedere aut judicare is an important one for
international law, it is not clear how best the Commission might proceed. One
possibility would be for a general study of the complex web of treaties that contains aut
dedere/aut judicare obligations, but that task has already been accomplished by a study
of  the  Commission’s  secretariat in 2010, which analyzed sixty-one multilateral treaties
at global and regional level. 44 Another possibility would be for the Commission to
address a specific problem or difficulty that States are confronting in fulfilling those
treaty obligations, but to date no chronic problem regarding treaty language or treaty
43

See 2012 Report, supra note 1, at 120; Questions Relating to the Obligation to

Prosecute or Extradite, I.C.J. Judgment, July 20, 2012, at <http://www.icjcij.org/docket/files/144/17064.pdf>.
44

Survey of multilateral conventions which may be of relevance for the work of the

International  Law  Commission  on  the  topic  “The  obligation  to  extradite  or  prosecute  
(aut dedere aut judicare),”  Study  by  the  Secretariat  of  the  International  Law  
Commission, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/630 (June 18, 2010).
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interpretation has been identified. There are, of course, specific issues of
implementation that will arise in certain circumstances, where two States disagree about
the application of discrete facts to their treaty obligations (as occurred in the
Belgium/Senegal case), but those are not issues the Commission can resolve.

Alternatively, the Commission might address whether there exists (or does not
exist) as a matter of customary international law an aut dedere/aut judicare obligation
with respect to certain types of crimes. In 1996, the Commission identified in its Draft
Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind a possible aut dedere/aut
judicare obligation with respect to genocide, crimes against humanity, and war
crimes.45 At that time, such an obligation was recognized by the Commission as
constituting progressive development of international law, which would only bind those
States that adopted and adhered to such a code (which has not happened to date). At
present, it may be difficult to establish widespread and uniform state practice in support
of a customary aut dedere/aut judicare obligation; even   for   the   “core   crimes”   of  

45

Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, Report of the

International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Eighth Session, UN GAOR,
51st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 9, UN Doc. A/51/10 (1996). Article 9 of the Draft Code
provides  that  “the  State  Party  in  the  territory  of  which  an  individual  alleged  to  have  
committed a crime set out in article 17, 18, 19 or 20 is found shall extradit e or prosecute
that  individual.”  Those  articles  deal  respectively  with  the  crime  of  genocide,  crimes  
against humanity, crimes against United Nations and associated personnel, and war
crimes.
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international   law,   “many   states   [have]   failed   to   define all of these crimes under
international law as crimes under national law.”46

The  International  Court’s  judgment  in  the  Belgium/Senegal  case  did  not  address  
whether there exists a customary aut dedere/aut judicare obligation, for jurisdictional
reasons. Yet Judge Abraham asserted that there was no customary norm binding upon
Senegal to prosecute former President Habré in its courts, whether for torture, war
crimes, crimes against humanity, or genocide. 47 Judge Abraham especially cast doubt on
the existence of a customary norm when the crime at issue was committed outside the
territory of the state seeking extradition, and neither the alleged offender nor the victims
were nationals of that state. 48 Though Belgium apparently presented to the Court data
concerning fifty-one states that exercised certain forms of universal jurisdiction, 49 Judge
Abraham regarded such data as inadequate to support a customary norm, 50 asserting that
his own country of France’s  exercise  of  universal jurisdiction was either treaty-based or

46

AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL , UNIVERSAL J URISDICTION : A PRELIMINARY S URVEY OF

LEGISLATION AROUND THE WORLD , at 1 (2011).
47

Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra note 42,

Separate Opinion of Judge Abraham, at para. 21.
48

Id., paras. 31-33.

49

Id., para. 34.

50

Id., paras. 36-38.
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done as a matter of sovereign discretion, not due to opinio juris.51 Judge ad hoc Sur
concurred that a customary aut dedere/aut judicare obligation did not exist and further
indicated  that  the  Court’s  unwillingness  to  reach  the  issue  on  the   merits was driven, in
part, by a concern that the Court not stifle the emergence of such a norm in the future by
declaring its non-existence today. 52

These and other matters concerning this topic remain to be discussed within the
Commission during the upcoming sixty-five session, for the purpose of deciding
whether and, if so, how to move forward with this topic.

Protection of persons in the event of disasters

As special rapporteur for this topic, Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (Colombia) has
completed five reports analyzing the applicable international law in circumstances of
disaster,  defined  as  “a  calamitous  event  or  series  of  events  resulting  in  widespread  loss  
of life, great human suffering and distress, or large-scale material or environmental
damage, thereby   seriously   disrupting   the   functioning   of   society.” 53 The draft articles

51

Id., para. 39.

52

Questions Relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite, supra note 42,

Dissenting Opinion of ad hoc Judge Sur, at para. 21.
53

Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, Art. 3, in 2012

Report, supra note 1, at 90, para. 81 [hereinafter Draft Articles on the Protection of
Persons in the Event of Disasters].
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seek to set forth rules applicable to the state in which the disaster occurred and to those
states or non-state actors that are in a position to provide assistance. As has been noted
elsewhere, the topic is somewhat unusual in that it is unclear whether existing state
practice  reflects  legal  rights  or  obligations,  and  there  is  “little  by  way  of  relevant  treaty  
provisions  or  judicial  or  arbitral  decisions”  to  guide  the  Commission. 54

To date, eleven draft articles have been provisionally adopted on matters such as
the duty and forms of cooperation and offers of assistance. Key articles provisionally
adopted so far55 provide   that   the   “affected   State,   by virtue of its sovereignty, has the
duty to ensure the protection of persons and provision of disaster relief and assistance
on its territory”  (Art.  9),  and  “the duty to seek assistance from among other States, the
United Nations, other competent intergovernmental organizations and rel evant nongovernmental organizations, as appropriate”  (Art.  10).  At  the  same  time,  the  “provision
of external assistance requires the consent of the affected State,”  although  that  consent  
“shall not be withheld arbitrarily”  (Art.  11). In crafting such articles, the Commission is
seeking to balance the responsibility of a State toward its nationals in a time of disaster
with its sovereign right to determine whether and how assistance from other States shall
occur.

During the sixty-fourth session, the Commission’s   drafting   committee  
considered and adopted further articles elaborating on the duty to cooperate, the
54

McRae, supra note 2, at 336.

55

Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of Disasters, supra note 53,

Arts. 9-11.

17
conditions that may be placed on assistance, and termination of assistance. ValenciaOspina will prepare two further reports focusing on the pre-disaster phase and on the
protection of relief personnel and miscellaneous issues, with the intention of completing
a first reading of the draft articles by the end of this quinquennium (i.e., by 2016).

Immunity of state officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction

As   indicated   by   the   title,   this   topic   is   not   concerned   with   a   state   official’s  
immunity from the jurisdiction of international criminal tribunals, is not concerned with
the  official’s  immunity   from   the   jurisdiction  of   the  state   of  his   or   her   own nationality,
and   is   not   concerned   with   the   official’s   immunity   from   civil   jurisdiction.   Rather,   the  
topic concerns immunity of a state official from the national criminal jurisdiction of
another state.

The   topic   was   included   in   the   ILC’s   agenda   in   2007   and   Roman   A.   Kolodkin  
(Russia) was appointed Special Rapporteur. Thereafter, he submitted three reports
which were discussed by the Commission in 2008 and 2011. Those reports canvassed in
considerable depth state practice on the subject, as well as important decisions by the
International Court of Justice. For example, in the 2008 case on Certain Questions of
Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, the Court asserted that a claim of immunity for
a government official is, in essence, a claim of immunity for the state, from which the
official benefits. 56 For   this   reason,   a   state   may   waive   the   official’s   immunity;;   it   is   an  

56

Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djib. v. Fr.), 2008 I.C.J

177, ¶ 188 (June 4).

18
immunity that, at its heart, is meant to protect the state and not the official. In the 20 02
Arrest Warrant judgment, the Court identified heads of state, heads of government, and
foreign ministers, along with other holders of high-ranking office, as enjoying full
immunity from criminal jurisdiction while in office, without exception. 57 Such
immunity (typically referred to as immunity rationae personae) only applies during the
official’s   time   in   office,   and   may   be   distinguished   from   the   immunity   held   by   state  
officials more generally for  their  “official”  acts,  while  in  office  and  thereafter  (typically
referred to as immunity ratione materiae).

Based on his analysis of state practice and international jurisprudence, Kolodkin
concluded   that   “[o]n   the   whole,   the   immunity   of   a   State   official,   like   that   of   the   State  
itself, from foreign jurisdiction is the general rule, and its absence in a particular case is
the  exception  to  this  rule.” 58 Further,  “the  absence  of  immunity  …  has  to  be  proven,  and  
not  …  the  existence  of  immunity.” 59 Any exception to such immunity can be found only
if it has developed into a norm of customary international law,60 which Kolodkin found
had   not   occurred.   Indeed,   in   his   view   the   “various   rationales   for   exceptions   to   the  
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immunity of State officials from foreign criminal jurisdiction are not sufficiently
convincing,”61 including   “the   proposition   that   very   grave   human   rights   violations   are  
criminalized   and   prohibited   by   the   peremptory   norms   of   general   international   law,” 62
and   “the   idea   that   a   customary   norm   of   international   law   has   developed,   under   which  
such immunity does not operate where an official has committed a grave crime under
international   law.” 63 Kolodkin did not propose any draft articles codifying or
progressively developing the law on this topic and did not stand for reelection at the end
of the quinquennium.

At its sixty-fourth session, the Commission appointed as Special Rapporteur for
the topic Conception Escobar Hernandez (Spain) – the first woman to serve as a special
rapporteur in the history of the Commission. Escobar Hernández prepared and the
Commission discussed a preliminary report, which signaled that she intends to build
upon Kolodkin’s  work,  but  with  a  fresh  look,  and  for  the  purpose  of  formulating  draft  
articles. Escobar Hernández intends to submit a first report for consideration at the
ILC’s   sixty-fifth session in 2013, to be followed by further reports, all with the
intention of completing a series of draft articles on first reading by the end of the
current quinquennium. To assist in its work, the Commission is asking states to provide
information on their national law and practice on the following questions: (1) does the
distinction between immunity ratione personae and immunity ratione materiae result in
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different legal consequences and, if so, how are they treated differently?; and (2) what
criteria are used in identifying the persons covered by immunity ratione personae?”64

In its 2012 judgment on Jurisdictional Immunities of the State, the International
Court   found   that   “customary   international   law   does   not   treat a   State’s   entitlement   to  
immunity as dependent upon the gravity of the act of which it is accused or the
peremptory   nature   of   the   rule   which   it   is   alleged   to   have   violated.” 65 Although in that
instance the Court made a point of saying that it was only assessing state immunity, not
immunity of officials, 66 there   are   various   ways   in   which   the   Court’s   basic   reasoning  
nevertheless may be  relevant  to  the  ILC’s  work  on  official  immunity.   First, the Court
said it was problematic to deny state immunity based solely on an allegation of a serious
international crime, because doing so invites a litigant to craft the allegations skillfully
solely to negate the immunity. 67 Second, even an  allegation  that  the  state’s  acts  violated  
a norm of jus cogens was not seen as altering a norm on state immunity from national
jurisdiction, since the two norms are addressing different things. 68 (The jus cogens rule
may establish that the act was substantively unlawful, but that does not mean that the

64

65

2012 Report, supra note 1, at 8, para. 28.
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), 2012 I.C.J. ¶ 84 (date),

available online at <www.icj-cij.org>.
66

Id. ¶ 91.

67

Id. ¶ 82.

68

Id. ¶¶ 92-97.

21
illegal act, as a procedural matter, may be litigated in a national court.)69 Third,
stripping away state immunity was not appropriate simply to ensure accountability;
there was no evidence that the right to state immunity was preconditioned on the
availability of a venue other than national courts for pursuing redress.70 Fourth, in terms
of methodology, the Court appears to have assumed the existence of immunity and then
looked for an exception based on settled state practice. 71 Such reasoning might be
applied to immunities of officials as well.

69

If such reasoning is relevant to the immunity of officials, it may refute arguments

advanced by some judges in national and international proceedings. See, e.g., R. v. Bow
St. Metro. Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] UKHL 17, [2000] 1
A.C. 147, 278 (H.L.) (opinion of Lord Millett in the House of Lords third major
decision in the Pinochet case); Italy v. Lozano, Case No. 31171/2008; ILDC 1805 (IT
2008) (July 24, 2008) (decision by Italian Court of Cassation); Al -Adsani v. United
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These matters, as well as new decisions at the national level concerning
immunity of foreign officials from criminal jurisdiction, will continue to be discussed
within the Commission during this quinquennium.

Provisional application of treaties

The Commission also decided at the sixty-fourth session to add to its agenda a
new topic on the provisional application of treaties and to appoint Juan Manuel Gomez Robledo (Mexico) as Special Rapporteur. 72 This topic concerns the application of the
rights and obligations of a treaty prior to the point where the treaty enters into force,
pursuant to an agreement between the parties that the treaty shall be applied
provisionally. Gomez-Robledo chaired informal consultations on the topic as a means
of obtaining guidance from ILC members for use in preparing his first report, which
will be considered at the sixty-fifth session in 2013.

Although this topic has not received much attention in the academic literature,
and is not a common feature of treaty practice, provisional application nevertheless can
arise in some very significant multilateral agreements, such as trade and commodity
agreements, and significant bilateral agreements, including arms control and maritime
agreements. For example, the United States maritime boundaries with Russia in the
Arctic Ocean, Bering Sea, and northern Pacific Ocean, and with Cuba,73 operate
provisionally. Likewise, when President Obama and Russian President Medvedev
signed   the   “New   START   Treaty”   on   April   8,   2010,   they also signed a protocol which
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provided  that  “[u]ntil  entry  into  force  of  the  Treaty,  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty  and  this  
Protocol, listed in this Part, shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of the
Treaty.” 74

Article 25 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) addresses
provisional application of treaties in two short paragraphs. 75 Nevertheless, several
questions   remain   outstanding   that   might   answered   through   the   Commission’s   work   on  
this topic, including what exactly is mean by “provisional application.” The VCLT does
not actually define “provisional”   or   “application,”   or   what   it   means   for   a   treaty   to   be  
“applied   provisionally.”   The   Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States identifies at least three   different   contexts   where   the   term   “provisional  
application”   has   been   used,   perhaps   not   always   correctly. 76 The manner in which
provisional application operates for a multilateral treaty might be clarified, given that
some states may have only voted to adopt the treaty, while others may have signed the
treaty, while still others may have failed to sign but have announced an intention to
74
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accede. Rules might also be developed on the processes of opting into or opting out of
provisional application, on the date when provisional application takes effect, and on
whether some parts of the treaty do not apply on the provisional basis if they seem to
presuppose actual entry into force of the agreement.77 The relationship with national
law also poses important issues; for example, Article 45(1) of the Energy Charter Treaty
provides that provisional application occurs “to   the   extent   that   such   provisional  
application   is   not   inconsistent   with   the   State’s   constitution,   laws   or   regulations .”78
Arguably, such a clause refers broadly to the ability of a state to apply provisionally a
treaty without normal ratification procedures, but it might also be said to require
consistency  between  particular  substantive  clauses  of  the  treaty  and  the  state’s  national  
law relating to those clauses.79 The date on which provisional application terminates
77
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Russian Federation, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility, para. 302 (Nov.
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might also be clarified. VCLT Art. 25(2) says it is terminated when the state notifies
other states that it intends not to become a party to the treaty, yet it presumably also
ends when the state becomes a party to the treaty in relation to other states that have
also become parties, while continuing in relation to those states that have not .80 The
Commission might also confirm that an agreement to apply a treaty provisionally
creates a legally-binding obligation, as opposed to a political commitment, the breach of
which does not engage the legal responsibility of the state. The view is often expressed
in state practice that such an agreement is legally binding,81 and arbitral decisions 82 and
leading commentators 83 appear to be in accord.

pending its entry into force unless the principle of provisional application itself were
inconsistent  ‘with  its  constitution,  laws  or  regulations.’”)  
80
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Formation and evidence of customary international law

The Commission decided at the sixty-fourth session to add to its agenda a new
topic on the formation and evidence of customary international law and to appoint
Michael Wood (United Kingdom) as Special Rapporteur. As indicated by the title, the
topic is not aimed at canvassing the substantive rules of customary international law
but,  rather,  at  the  “secondary”  rules  regarding how such law is formed, and the types of
evidence relevant in determining whether the requirements set forth in those secondary
rules have been met. The objectives of the topic generally are twofold: to provide
greater certainty as to the process of customary international law formation, so as to
encourage greater acceptance of such law; and to provide practical guidance to judges
and lawyers called upon to apply this law, including within national legal systems.
at  para.  313  (“[T]he  fundamental  reason  why  States agree to apply a treaty provisionally
. . . [is] in order to assume obligations immediately pending the completion of various
internal  procedures  necessary  to  have  the  treaty  enter  into  force.”);;  id.,  at  para.  314  
(“Allowing  a  State  to  modulate  (or,  as  the case may be, eliminate) the obligation of
provisional application, depending on the content of its internal law in relation to the
specific provisions found in the Treaty, would undermine the principle that provisional
application of a treaty creates binding  obligations.”)
83

See, e.g., THE V IENNA C ONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES : A COMMENTARY,

VOLUME 1, at 652 (Olivier  Corten  &  Pierre  Klein,  eds.,  2011)  (“provided  that  it  is  valid,  
the agreement on provisional application produces the same legal effects as any
international agreement and as such, it is subject to the rule pacta sunt servanda.”).
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One existing restatement of law in this area is the Statement of Principles
Applicable to the Formation of General Customary International Law, adopted in 2000
by the International Law Association. 84 That restatement contains thirty-three
principles, with associated commentary, and may be a   prototype   for  the  Commission’s  
end-product (Wood has indicated that he does not favor the development of draft
articles).  Two  important  issues  that  will  no  doubt  feature  in  the  Commission’s  work  are:    
the degree to which resolutions of international organizations can serve as evidence of
the existence of a customary norm; and the circumstances under which a widely
accepted multilateral treaty may be said to codify or crystalize a customary norm, such
that it non-parties to the treaty are also bound to the norm.

The Commission engaged in an initial debate on the topic, based on a Note
prepared by Wood,85 as a means of providing guidance to him for preparing his first
report, which will be considered at the sixty-fifth session in 2013. Further, the
Commission’s  secretariat  will  prepare  a  study  of  the  previous  work  of  the  Commission  
relevant to this topic. The Commission is also asking governments to provide
84
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information on their state practice relating to the formation of customary international
law and the types of evidence suitable for establishing such law in a given situation. 86

Treaties over time

The Commission reconstituted its study group on this topic for the sixty-fourth
session, which completed its consideration of the second report by its chairman, Georg
Nolte  (Germany).  The  second  report  focused  on  the  jurisprudence  of  “special  regimes”  
(such as the World Trade Organization Dispute Resolution Body or regional human
rights courts) addressing the use of subsequent agreements or subsequent practice when
interpreting a treaty. Further, the second report contained a series of preliminary
conclusions, which have been reformulated based on discussions within the study
group. The study group also considered a third report by the chairman focused on the
use of subsequent agreement or practice outside the judicial or quasi-judicial context,
such as in the practice of states or international organizations. 87

In light of the progress to date, the Commission has decided to pursue this topic
in  the  future  under  the  title  “subsequent  agreements  and  subsequent  practice  in  relation  
to the interpretation of treaties,”  with Nolte as special rapporteur. It is expected that he
will develop further reports integrating and extending the work to date on this topic,
with finalization of a series of draft conclusions and commentary by the end the current
quinquennium.
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Most-favored-nation clause

During the sixty-fourth session, the Commission reconstituted its study group on
this topic, under the chairmanship of Donald McRae (Canada). Generally, the objective
of this topic is to identify areas where the Commission might assist in minimizing the
fragmentation of international law as it relates to interpretation of most -favored-nation
(MFN) clauses, especially by disparate arbitral tribunals convened pursuant to
investment treaties.

The principal focus of the discussion at the sixty-fourth session were the factors
that influence investment tribunals when interpreting MFN clauses, with particular
attention as to whether MFN clauses can and do encompass provisions on dispute
resolution (in other words, whether a more favorable dispute resolution provision in
another investment treaty may be invoked by the investor). 88 In that regard, the Study
Group tentatively concluded that whether an MFN provision was capable of applying to
a dispute resolution provision was a matter of treaty interpretation, one that could only
be answered in the circumstances of each particular treaty, and that states were free to
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expressly include or exclude such application. Where the issue was not expressly
addressed, the Study Group identified various potentially relevant factors for further
study,   such   as   whether   it   matters   if   the   rule   being   imported   relates   to   the   tribunal’s  
jurisdiction as compared with the admissibility of the claim.

The Working Group is not planning to revise or supplement the draft articles on
MFN clauses that were completed in 1978. Rather, McRae intends in 2013 to present a
draft final report of the working group analyzing and contextualizing the case law in
this area, and possibility developing guidelines or model clauses for addressing problem
areas. The Working Group or its Chairman may then be in a position to complete a final
report by 2015.

III.

FUTURE T OPICS AND PROCEDURAL M ATTERS

At present the Commission has seven topics on its long-term work program,
which might be moved to its active agenda: ownership & protection of wrecks beyond
the limits of national maritime jurisdiction (added in 1996); jurisdictional immunity of
international organizations (2006); protection of personal data in trans-border flow of
information (2006); extraterritorial jurisdiction (2006); fair and equitable treatment
standard in international investment law (2011); protection of the environment in
relation to armed conflicts (2011); and protection of the atmosphere (2011). The last
two of these topics were discussed at some length during the sixty-fourth session, but no
decision was reached on whether to move forward with them.

